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Voluntary actions are often accompanied by a conscious experience of intention. The content of this
experience, and its neural basis, remain controversial. On one view, the mind just retrospectively ascribes
intentions to explain the occurrence of actions that lack obvious triggering stimuli. Here, we use EEG
frequency analysis of sensorimotor rhythms to investigate brain activity when a participant (CL, co-au-
thor of this paper) with congenital absence of the left hand and arm, prepared and made a voluntary
action with the right or the phantom “left hand”. CL reported the moment she experienced the intention
to press a key. This timepoint was then used as a marker for aligning and averaging EEG. In a second
condition, CL was asked to prepare the action on all trials, but then, on some trials, to cancel the action at
the last moment. For the right hand, we observed a typical reduction in beta-band spectral power prior
to movement, followed by beta rebound after movement. When CL prepared but then cancelled a
movement, we found a characteristic EEG pattern reported previously, namely a left frontal increase in
spectral power close to the time of the perceived intention to move. Interestingly, the same neural
signatures of positive and inhibitory volition were also present when CL prepared and inhibited move-
ments with her phantom left hand. These EEG signals were all similar to those reported previously in a
group of 14 healthy volunteers. Our results suggest that conscious intention may depend on preparatory
brain activity, and not on making, or ever having made, the corresponding physical body movement.
Accounts that reduce conscious volition to mere retrospective confabulation cannot easily explain our
participant's neurophenomenology of action and inhibition. In contrast, the results are consistent with
the view that speciﬁc neural events prior to movement may generate conscious experiences of positive
and negative volition.
& 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Some voluntary actions are accompanied by an experience of
conscious intention, of initiating and controlling our actions. The
basis of this experience of conscious intention is vigorously de-
bated. Some stimulation (Fried et al., 1991) and recording (Mu-
kamel et al., 2010) results suggest that the experience of conscious
intention is associated with activation of speciﬁc structures in the
medial frontal and parietal lobes (Desmurget et al., 2009). On an
alternative view, the experience of conscious intention is not so
much a direct read-out of any speciﬁc brain activity, but an in-
ference about the causes of internally-generated actions. Thus, one
might infer that one's own actions have some internal cause by32
ic and Neurodevelopmental
euroscience, King's College
8AF, United Kingdom.
h).general principles of causal reasoning. This cause would then be
retrospectively inserted into the narrative stream of conscious-
ness. Conscious intention would then not correspond to a mental
state, in the normal sense, but to a reconstructive confabulation of
action authorship (Wegner, 2002). The inferential or re-
constructive view has received strong support from studies
showing that attribution of agency (Wegner and Wheatley, 1999)
and even primary experience of action (Moore et al., 2009) are
strongly inﬂuenced by the context of action, and by the occurrence
of events that might plausibly be caused by intentional actions.
Reconstructive inference raises a major methodological pro-
blem for studying action awareness. Most methods for in-
vestigating awareness involve a subjective report, which typically
occurs after the event to which it refers. Even if there is a pure,
premotor experience of intention that precedes action, most ex-
perimental reports of this experience are obtained after action. The
experience of intention will then be altered by how the body ac-
tually moves. In fact, the entire experience of intention could be an
invention by the mind to justify how and why the body moved. It
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tion, independent of the bodily actions with which intention is
associated (Fried et al., 1991).
The positions of “no volition, just inferential reconstructivism”
and “direct access to conscious intention” may both be excessively
strong. Recent work on consciousness suggests that all percep-
tions, not just conscious intention, are a form of synthetic in-
ference based on integration of multiple neural activities over time
(Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). Therefore, understanding how and
when the experience of volition is generated in the human brain,
and which circuits are involved in generating it, remains an im-
portant question in the understanding of consciousness. The case
of volition may have particular applied importance, because most
systems of law assume that an experience of willing an action,
and/or failing to inhibit the action, is necessary for a person to be
judged socially and legally responsible.
The everyday experience of action is strongly linked to the
process of initiating actions (Libet et al., 1983). However, neu-
ropsychologists have long recognised that a key element of be-
havioural control involves inhibiting actions that may be sug-
gested by the environment, or by our previous experience (Della
Sala et al., 1991). Accordingly, we recently suggested that the
neural computations involved in voluntary action include a crucial
decision regarding whether to act or not [the What, When, Whe-
ther (WWW) model of intentional action] (Brass and Haggard,
2008). This decision could act as a ﬁnal point of control over be-
haviour (Filevich et al., 2012). The status of conscious processing in
such inhibition is particularly controversial (Hughes et al., 2009;
Libet, 2009). However, inhibition of action does not have any be-
havioural marker, by deﬁnition. This makes studying intentional
inhibition of human action particularly challenging. We have
previously shown that the conscious experience of intending to act
can serve as a subjective marker for actions that are prepared, but
subsequently inhibited (Brass and Haggard, 2007). In particular,
we showed that the reduction in beta-band EEG power that pre-
cedes voluntary action was replaced, in trials where participants
freely chose to inhibit their actions (Walsh, E., et al., 2010).
Here we have tested an individual with congenital absence of
the left arm in a voluntary action and voluntary inhibition para-
digm. CL is a 37 year old (at time of testing) performance artist,
born without a left hand and arm. She is a co-author of this paper.
CL experiences occasional but vivid phantom sensations related to
the “left hand”. The experiences include strong urges to move and
control her phantom left limb. Her participation in the experiment
offered a unique window into the neurophenomenological me-
chanisms of voluntary action and voluntary inhibition. First, we
wished to investigate whether preparation of movements with the
phantom hand might be accompanied by a subjective sense of
volition, and by the normal neurophysiological markers of volun-
tary action. A further scientiﬁc reason for studying CL's perfor-
mance is the opportunity for a novel comparison between vo-
luntary action and voluntary inhibition of action. In the normal
case, the comparison between action and inhibition inevitably
involves body movement in the former case, but not the latter.
Thus, sensory feedback from the body movement may confound
any contrast between action and inhibition conditions. In princi-
ple, neurophysiological measures of preparation prior to action
may avoid this confound, because physical body movement has
not yet begun. However, any difference between action and in-
hibition conditions could still reﬂect differences in predicted sen-
sory feedback, rather than an active process of inhibition conﬁned
to the inhibition condition. In the case of a phantom limb, in
contrast, action and inhibition are physically identical, and are
presumably predicted to be physically identical. Therefore, any
difference in neurophysiological markers must reﬂect a central
neurocognitive process of inhibition. In line with CL's subjectiveexperiences of command over her phantom left hand, such voli-
tional control might arise from innate core cortical mechanisms.
Alternatively, CL might acquire volitional control over her phan-
tom left hand via a process of generalisation or interhemispheric
transfer from motor representations for her right hand; in which
case pre-movement ERD before actions made by her phantom left
hand might appear as “weak echoes”. Finally, the results could
contribute to the understanding of phantom limb phenomena
per se. To our knowledge, no previous study has investigated ei-
ther the preparation or the inhibition of voluntary actions of a
phantom limb.2. Methods
2.1. Procedure
The method was essentially similar to a previous experiment
performed with a group of 14 two-handed volunteers, and pre-
viously reported elsewhere (Walsh, E., et al., 2010). Brieﬂy, in the
previous study participants performed self-paced voluntary key-
presses with the right hand in one condition. Using the “Libet
method”, participants reported the time at which they experi-
enced the conscious intention to make the voluntary action. Par-
ticipants were asked to act within the ﬁrst revolution of the clock-
hand, in order to avoid ambiguities regarding whether their sub-
jective reports referred to the ﬁrst or to subsequent rotations of
the clock-hand. Further, the clock rotation period was set to
5120 ms (Walsh, E., et al., 2010), rather than the 2560 ms used in
previous studies (Haggard et al., 2002), to ensure an adequate
period for freely choosing when to act. In further blocks of trials,
they were given the additional instruction to inhibit the action at
the last possible moment on some trials that they freely chose,
while still reporting the time of intending the action, the so called
“W time” (Libet et al., 1983), whether they actually cancelled it or
not. Here, CL performed the same task in the same conditions as
the control participants. In a ﬁrst session, she used her right hand
(see Fig. 1). In a second session, conducted some 10 weeks later,
she performed the same tasks with her phantom left hand. In the
“left hand” inhibition block, CL reported after each trial whether
she had acted or inhibited on that trial, since there could be no
behavioural marker of this decision in the absence of a physical
left hand. In each session, there was an initial practise block of
“action-only” trials. This was followed by two further action-only
blocks, and then four blocks in which the participant freely chose
on each trial whether to act or inhibit action (“act-or-inhibit”
trials). Each block comprised 40 trials. Testing was performed with
the permission of the local ethics committee, and in accordance
with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki.
2.2. EEG recording and analysis
EEG data were recorded from sites F3, Fz, F4, FC3, FCz, FC4, C3,
Cz, C4, P3, Pz, P4, O1 and O2. EEG was sampled at 500 Hz, band-
pass ﬁltered between 0.1 and 250 Hz, and re-referenced to linked
mastoid electrodes. The EEG power in the upper alpha- and lower
beta- bands, previously associated with motor preparation and
execution (Pfurtscheller and Lopes da Silva, 1999), was computed.
Our analyses focussed on established EEG markers of volition: the
event-related desynchronisation (ERD) prior to voluntary action,
and post-movement beta rebound. We were also interested in
whether CL would show an event-related synchronisation (ERS)
associated with action inhibition, similar to that reported pre-
viously. The time and frequency windows used for each planned
analysis are reported with the results. CL's data were compared
between her actual right hand and phantom left hand as a within-
Fig. 1. Measuring conscious intention regarding the decision to act, on trials where actions were executed or cancelled at the last moment.
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was compared with previously-published data from a group of
two-handed volunteers (Walsh, E., et al., 2010).
The EEG processing followed standard methods used in the
previous study (Walsh, E., et al., 2010). Brieﬂy, artefacts and blinks
were excluded by rejecting epochs containing signals greater than
þ120 mV or less than 120 mV; for the phantom left hand, 28% of
epochs were rejected and 19% for the right hand. Epochs were
extracted from 1000 ms before to 500 ms after each event relative
to CL's average, baseline corrected using a window from 1000 to
800 ms prior to the locking event. Separate averages were ob-
tained for each of the following trial types: action-only trials, ac-
tion trials in act-or-inhibit blocks, and inhibition trials in act-or-
inhibit blocks.3. Results
CL reported no particular difﬁculty performing the Libet task. In
the session where she used her phantom left hand, she reported a
sensation of preparing and commanding the keypress action of the
“left hand”. Interestingly, in blocks where she had to prepare but
then sometimes inhibit the action of the “left hand”, she sponta-
neously reported the phantom “left hand” as wilful, and difﬁcult to
control. She reported having to make a particularly strong effort to
inhibit the actions of the “left hand” on selected trials, because of
the compelling urge for the “left hand” to make keypress actions.
3.1. Behavioural results
In the condition where CL could freely choose to inhibit on
certain trials, she chose to do so on 53% of trials for the right hand,
and reported doing so for 46% of trials for the “left hand”. In
contrast, in the control dataset published previously, participants
inhibited on 49.7% (range 41.2–60.4%) of trials. We also compared
the perceived time of intention with the actual time of the key-
press for right hand actions only. In action-only blocks, CL reported
an experience of intention, or “W judgement” (Libet et al., 1983), of76 and 116 ms for each of the two action-only blocks, yielding
a mean W judgement of 96 ms (SD across trials¼164 ms) before
the keypress. In action-only blocks, the control group participants
had a mean W judgement at 283 ms (SD across
participants¼164 ms) before the keypress. In the four act-or-in-
hibit blocks, CL reported a mean experience of intention 38 ms
(range 21 to 53 ms for the 4 blocks; SD across trials¼104 ms)
before the keypress. The control group participants had a mean W
judgement at 408 ms (range: 580 ms to þ11 ms across in-
dividuals; SD¼415 ms) before the keypress. W judgement times
generally show considerable variation across individuals (Trevena
and Miller, 2002). We used the procedure of Crawford and
Garthwaite (Crawford and Garthwaite, 2002; Crawford et al., 2010)
for comparing a single case with a control population, and for
calculating effect sizes. In action-only blocks, CL's W judgements
for the right hand, compared with those of the controls (Walsh, E.,
et al., 2010), and showed no signiﬁcant difference: t¼1.102,
p¼0.291. Likewise, in act-or-inhibit blocks, CL's W judgements for
the right hand also did not differ from those of the control sample:
t¼0.861, p¼0.405.
3.2. EEG results
CL's EEG data were inspected to test three speciﬁc predictions
based on previous studies. First, we predicted a premovement ERD
in motor rhythms during action preparation (Pfurtscheller and
Lopes da Silva, 1999). Second, we predicted a post-movement beta
rebound (Neuper and Pfurtscheller, 2001). Third, we predicted an
ERS associated with the decision to inhibit (Walsh, E., et al., 2010).
In each case we compared CL's phantom left hand with her right
hand, and with previously-published data from two-handed con-
trols (Walsh, E., et al., 2010). As before, we restricted our search for
neural activity relative to intentional inhibition to a time from
340 ms before to 340 ms after the W judgement and a frequency
range of 8–24 Hz (alpha- and beta-bands). In addition, we re-
stricted our analyses to induced, rather than evoked activity, be-
cause induced activity does not imply precise event-related time-
locking captured by evoked analyses. We used subjective time
Fig. 2. Spectral power for action trials in the mu- and beta-bands around the time
of conscious intention, contralateral to the acting hand. The data are shown time-
locked to the average time of conscious intention to act (W judgement, dashed
vertical line). (a, b) Action-only blocks and (c, d) action trials in the act-or-inhibit
condition. Note the contralateral mapping between the scalp electrodes and the
hands. Blue colour indicates event-related desynchronisation (ERD). Red indicates
event-related synchronisation (ERS). Note mu-ERD prior to and during movement,
followed by ERS (beta rebound: BR) after movement. Arrows show peak values of
ERD prior to, and ERS after the moment of conscious intention. For actions using
CL's phantom left hand, the contralateral right motor cortex EEG is shown (elec-
trode C4, b, d). For actions using the right hand, electrode C3 is shown (a, c). (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred
to the web version of this article.)
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generally rather low.
We thus investigated whether CL showed an ERD during action
preparation, and a beta rebound, on action trials. We separately
considered the blocks consisting only of actions (action-only
blocks), and the action trials from act-or-inhibit blocks. Fig. 2
shows the classic, clear pre-movement ERD, shown as blue colour
in the 8-24 Hz region in both CL's data. For CL, pre-movement ERD
is visibly greater preceding actions of the phantom left hand
(Fig. 2d) than in the physically-present right hand (Fig. 2c). Fig. 2a
and c also shows a clear rebound ERS for the right hand. This re-
bound ERS occurs in the same frequency range as premovement
ERD, beginning immediately after the average W judgement. This
rebound ERS is more visible for the phantom left hand (Fig. 2d, see
arrow) than the physically-present right hand (Fig. 2c, see arrow).
The full results are shown in Table 1.
Fig. 3 shows the EEG data for trials in act-or-inhibit blocks
where CL chose to inhibit action. In previous work (Walsh, E., et al.,
2010), we had found an increased oscillatory power in the low
beta range linked to this event. CL's data also show a clear ERS
peak in the same frequency range, both for the physically-present
right hand, and for the phantom left hand (Table 2).
We wanted to address statistically the hypothesis that a
phantom limb can support neural processes of voluntary action
preparation, and of voluntary action inhibition. We statistically
assessed (Crawford and Garthwaite, 2002; Crawford et al., 2010)
whether CL's premovement ERD, rebound ERS, and inhibition ERS
differed from those in the control group. Premovement ERD and
rebound ERS were tested separately for action-only blocks and for
action trials in act-or-inhibit blocks. We applied this test to the
time, frequency and amplitude of CL's data for the contralateral
hemisphere, for each of these three events of interest. In each case
we compared CL's phantom left hand and her right hand with the
previously-published data from two-handed controls (Walsh, E.,
et al., 2010). As in the previous study, we restricted our search for
neural activity relative to intentional inhibition to a time from
340 ms before to 340 ms after the W judgement and a frequency
range of 8–24 Hz (alpha- and beta-bands). In all of the 36 tests
performed (see Supplementary material), CL's EEG peaks lay
within the 95% conﬁdence interval for the control group, when
corrected for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni corrected; McDo-
nald, 2009). Importantly, all the amplitudes of premovement ERD,
rebound ERS and inhibition-related ERS fell within the conﬁdence
interval for the controls. Thus, the timing, frequency and ampli-
tude of CL's EEG activities did not reliably differ from controls, and
were present for both the physically-present right hand and for
the phantom left hand.4. Discussion
We show that a participant (CL) with congenital absence of the
left hand and arm showed three classic central markers of volition
with respect to simple movements of the left hand. We asked CL to
perform simple voluntary keypress actions with her physically-
present right hand, or with her phantom “left hand”, in the con-
text of the Libet experiment (Libet et al., 1983). By using the re-
ported time of intention to act as a subjective marker of volition,
we were able to examine the neural correlates of volition for a
phantom hand, for the ﬁrst time. The pre-movement decrease in
oscillatory power in the alpha and beta bands is a classic central
signature of the preparation of voluntary action (Pfurtscheller and
Aranibar, 1979; Pfurtscheller and Lopes da Silva, 1999; Stančák
et al., 2000). CL exhibited this premovement event-related de-
synchronisation (ERD) to an extent that was indistinguishable
from normal controls, both with the physically-present right hand,
Table 1
EEG results from action trials for participant CL and a control group (Walsh, E., et al., 2010). The results show the spectral power (dB) in the motor rhythm range (8–24 Hz)
around the time of conscious intention (340 to 0 and 0 to þ340 ms relative to mean W judgment). For the pre-W time window, the time, frequency and amplitude of EEG
minima are shown as a measure of ERD. For the post-W time window, the time, frequency and amplitude of EEG maxima are shown as a measure of post-movement beta
rebound. For the control group data (N¼14), standard deviation across participants are given. Data for CL do not have an associated measure of variability. The electrodes of
interest (channels) are based on a previous study (Walsh, E., et al., 2010). n indicates a value signiﬁcantly different from the control sample (po0.05), using the method
described by Crawford and Garthwaite (2002).
Pre-W time 340 to 0 ms Post-W time 0 to þ340 ms
Trial type Channel Time (ms) Frequency (Hz) Amplitude (dB) Time (ms) Frequency (Hz) Amplitude (dB)
CL: right hand
Action-only C3 190 13.3 1.2 334 12.8 2.0
Action trials (act-or-inhibit blocks) 100 21.9 2.6 340 9.1 2.3
CL: phantom left hand
Action-only C4 70 24.4 1.9 340 15.3 2.0
Action trials (act-or-inhibit blocks) 52 8.8 2.8 340 12.3 4.1
Control group: right hand
Action-only C3 220 (126) 14.1 (3.5) 2.5 (1.2) 245 (93) 13.7 (3.3) 2.5 (1.1)
Action trials (act-or-inhibit blocks) 184 (100) 15.2 (6.0) 2.3 (1.6) 293 (65) 15.5 (4.5) 2.5 (1.1)
Fig. 3. Spectral power in the mu- and beta-bands around the time of conscious intention on inhibition trials from the act-or-inhibit blocks. The data are shown time-locked
to the average time of conscious intention to act (W judgement, dashed vertical line). Data are shown for inhibition of phantom left hand actions (a, c) and right hand actions
(b, d). Based on previous results, the FC3 (a, b) and FC4 (c, d) electrodes were analysed, for movements of both the right and left hand (Walsh, E., et al., 2010). Blue colour
indicates event-related desynchronisation (ERD), and red indicates event-related synchronisation (ERS). Note ERS occurs around the time of W judgement (arrows indicate
peak ERS values: see text). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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We also investigated the post-movement rebound phenom-
enon. Post-movement rebound is often attributed to the proprio-
ceptive feedback generated by a voluntary movement. In that case,
CL's phantom hand should show a reduced post-movement re-
bound. Our data did not support this hypothesis, as a clear beta
rebound can be seen (Fig. 2b and d). Beta rebound has also beennoted after withholding of a motor response, though in this case it
is weaker and shorter than after termination of movement (Solis-
Escalante et al., 2012). However, since our ﬁnding of beta-rebound
within normal range is a null result, further research is necessary
to understand the origin of the post-movement rebound. Finally,
in some blocks, we asked CL to choose to inhibit some actions at
the last possible moment. We had previously shown that such
Table 2
EEG results from inhibit trials in act-or-inhibit blocks. The time (ms), frequency
(Hz) and amplitude (dB) of a spectral peak are shown. The time window is 340 to
þ340 ms relative to W judgement, and the frequency window is 8 to 24 Hz. The
electrodes of interest (channels) are based on a previous study (Walsh, E., et al.,
2010). Data for participant CL and the control group (N¼14; mean and standard
deviation across individuals) are shown. n indicates a value signiﬁcantly different
from the control sample (po0.05), using the method described by Crawford and
Garthwaite (2002).
W time 7340 ms
Channel Time
(ms)
Frequency (Hz) Amplitude (dB)
CL's right hand FC3 324 16.1 2.0
CL's right hand FC4 336 15.9 1.6
CL's phantom left
hand
FC3 224 12.3 2.1
CL's phantom left
hand
FC4 214 20.7 2.1
Control group, right
hand
FC3 165
(171)
15.0 (5.0) 2.0 (0.8)
Control group, right
hand
FC4 45 (233) 16.3 (4.8) 2.0 (0.9)
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transient increase in EEG power (ERS) in the low-beta band. Again,
CL's performance was within normal limits, both for the physi-
cally-present right hand, and for the “phantom” left hand, and the
inhibition-related ERS was clearly visible in her data.
One previous study has investigated the neural basis of action
control in phantom limbs following amputation. Rafﬁn et al.
(2012) investigated the brain networks associated with instructed
sequences of ﬁnger-thumb opposition movements. When patients
were instructed to execute these movements with the phantom
hand, activation of sensorimotor cortical areas was found using
fMRI. Our premovement ERD data are broadly consistent with
these ﬁndings (Fig. 3a and c). Interestingly, merely imagining
making such movements with the phantom hand did not activate
the sensorimotor cortex (Rafﬁn et al., 2012), suggesting a dis-
sociation between imagining and executing movements of a
phantom limb.
The ability to form and inhibit intentions is the basis of human
voluntary control, and also plays a fundamental role in the social
and moral responsibility. Intentional action and intentional in-
hibition of action involve speciﬁc brain processes within the motor
system, and also speciﬁc conscious experiences (Brass and Hag-
gard, 2007; Fried et al., 1991; Ridderinkhof et al., 2014). Our data
suggest that these processes may function in the cortex even when
the body does not have the effectors for the intended action. Our
EEG measures were consistent with a full range of intentional
control over a phantom limb being possible. Importantly, CL
showed classic EEG signatures of both the positive volition re-
quired to initiate action, and of the negative volition required to
inhibit an action that is about to be performed.
The results obtained with CL's phantom left hand have several
important implications for current discussions of volition. First,
they point to volition being a purely central phenomenon, in-
dependent of actual motor behaviour. We found that CL's attempts
at intentional control over the phantom left hand were associated
with speciﬁc neural events, which were time-locked to a conscious
experience of intention. Since she had never had any experience of
moving a left hand, and since there was no detectable movement
in any effector during these attempts, we suggest that these neural
events are entirely central, rather than peripheral. Our result
therefore supports the view that voluntary action is a distinct
process of the motor areas of the cerebral cortex, and that this
process produces a characteristic conscious experience of volition.Importantly, the location of our EEG activations suggests that in-
tentional inhibition of action is also an identiﬁable process within
the frontal lobes.
Strongly reconstructivist accounts of volition might struggle to
explain these results. Reconstructive theories suggest that the
experience of volition is based largely on post-hoc inferences de-
rived from the observable results of our intentional actions, such
as the body movements and outcomes they produce (Wegner,
2002). In the case of CL's left arm, however, there was no physical
output in either action or inhibition trials. Nevertheless, a con-
scious experience of intention was present in each case. More in-
terestingly, the neural activities were quite different when CL
prepared and then “executed” a voluntary movement of the
phantom left hand, and when she prepared but then inhibited the
voluntary movement. These neural activities further corresponded
to those of a control group, both for intentional action, and for
intentional inhibition. In the control group, intentional actions and
intentional inhibitions differ because physical body movement is
present in the former but not the latter case. The presence, or even
the expectation, of this physical event could potentially explain
differences in neural activity in the control group. However, CL's
attempts to move her phantom left hand, and her attempts to
inhibit its movement, both appear to be purely central events,
without any identiﬁable bodily motoric expression. Therefore, the
characteristic neural signatures of action and inhibition need not
linked to the presence or absence of a physical hand movement.
Instead, they may reﬂect purely central mechanisms of generating,
and of inhibiting, the voluntary motor command.
Our inhibition-related ERS result may be particularly im-
portant. Intentional inhibition is difﬁcult to study experimentally,
due to the lack of behavioural markers (Filevich et al., 2012). In-
tentional inhibition was hypothesised to reﬂect active inhibition of
a prepared action, occurring entirely within the cerebral motor
system. However, previous results (Walsh, E., et al., 2010) could
potentially be explained if participants made a slight anticipatory
muscle contraction without pressing the response key (Leuthold
et al., 1996), and then “inhibited” by aborting this incipient muscle
contraction. Indeed, cessation of muscle activity is known to pro-
duce a post-movement beta rebound (Pfurtscheller, 1981; Salmelin
and Hari, 1994). Therefore, cessation of partial activity could po-
tentially explain previous reports of inhibition-related ERS. How-
ever, CL's data seem to rule out this possibility of a peripheral
origin of inhibition-related ERS, because the neural activity was
present when CL inhibited actions prepared with the phantom left
hand, just as much as when she inhibited actions prepared with
the physical right hand.
CL therefore, in line with her subjective experiences, appears to
have full volitional control over her phantom left hand, using a
neural mechanism comparable to volitional control of her physical
right hand. How might volitional control arise in the case of a
phantom hand? We see two possibilities. First, key elements of
volition might not be experience-dependant. The central gen-
erators for voluntary motor commands, and for inhibiting volun-
tary motor commands, may exist even when the peripheral motor
apparatus does not develop. Importantly, these volitional activities
must support a conscious experience of intention, since we de-
tected them by temporally aligning them with conscious intention
in a Libet paradigm. Despite never having consummated a vo-
luntary motor command for a left hand, CL's right hemisphere
generated both volition-related activity and volition-related ex-
perience. On one view, the core cortical mechanisms of volition
might be innate. CL may then not have needed to learn the voli-
tional control of the phantom left hand through experiences of
successful voluntary motor control. However, we cannot exclude
other possible alternative explanations, including interhemi-
spheric transfer.
E. Walsh et al. / Neuropsychologia 75 (2015) 341–348 347A second possibility exists. CL might have acquired volitional
control over the phantom left hand by a process of generalisation
or transfer from other motor representations. For example, as the
voluntary control of her right hand developed during childhood,
an interhemispheric coupling may have transferred the plastic
changes associated with acquisition of voluntary control from the
left hemisphere, controlling the contralateral physical right hand,
to the right hemisphere, controlling the phantom left hand. Im-
portantly, we found that pre-movement ERD before actions of the
phantom left hand was stronger in the contralateral right hemi-
sphere than in the ipsilateral left hemisphere (Fig. 2c and d). Vo-
lition-related processes in the right hemisphere were not merely
weak echoes of a stronger process in the hemisphere contralateral
to the intact hand. Thus, any interhemispheric transfer of volition
must be sufﬁcient to establish an independent voluntary control
mechanism in the hemisphere controlling the phantom limb. The
transfer of volition account implies that one voluntary control
module is sufﬁcient to provide “neural scaffolding” for other vo-
luntary control modules, and that actual peripheral movement and
feedback are not necessary. In this case, the voluntary control of
the right hand by the left hemisphere could provide sufﬁcient
neural organisation to underpin volitional control of the phantom
left hand by the right hemisphere, in the absence of any left hand
movement or sensation.
The interhemispheric transfer view makes the further inter-
esting prediction that the sense of voluntary control over a con-
genital phantom should increase during development, as children
progressively develop voluntary control over other body parts. We
are not aware of any autobiographical memory study of the age at
which phantom sensations appear. This seems an interesting area
for future research. However, phantom sensations are rather rare
in congenital amelia (Brugger, 2012). Of course, innateness and
total interhemispheric transfer of volition are extreme positions. A
more plausible alternative may involve a combination of an in-
nately-speciﬁed neural substrate in the cortical motor circuits,
supplemented by a developmental maturation of that pathway,
guided by experience transmitted through other cortical re-
presentations. CL's volition with respect to her phantom left hand
could reﬂect a combination of a preserved, possibly innate, cortical
motor map (Longo et al., 2012), and a generalisation of voluntary
action mechanisms in the left hemisphere that control her intact
right hand, to the right hemisphere representing the phantom left
hand.
We acknowledge a number of limitations of this study. Our
investigation is conﬁned to only one case of voluntary control over
a phantom limb. Comparison between the phantom left hand and
the intact right hand is based on individual averages, and lacks any
associated measure of variability or error term. Therefore, for ex-
ample, our ﬁnding of stronger pre-movement ERD contralateral to
the phantom left hand, rather than ipsilateral, was not evaluated
statistically. Observed differences in ERD/ERS frequencies in alpha
and beta bands (Figs. 2 and 3) might reﬂect distinct processes
(Buchholz et al., 2001), motor system reorganisation (Walsh, L.D.,
et al., 2010), or shifts in locations of cortical movement re-
presentations following from motor commands being sent to a
physically absent phantom hand (Giraux et al., 2001; Reilly et al.,
2006). Thus, differences in ERD/ERS frequencies, and their timing,
should be interpreted with caution. Caution is also required when
interpreting the relation between the time of conscious intention
and speciﬁc brain activities. Self-generated actions can be trig-
gered by any of a number of reasons, including habit (e.g.,
grooming behaviours), prospective management of future sensa-
tions (e.g., drinking water before you begin to feel thirsty), ex-
ploratory foraging, and improvisation (Hebb, 2005). The brain
mechanisms involved in these different situations are likely to be
diverse (Charles et al., 2014; Schurger et al., 2012).We did not directly compare our EEG measures for CL's “exe-
cuted” and “inhibited” left hand movements. Indeed, the in-
ferential value of doing so could be questioned, since the neural
measures themselves were deﬁned by similar contrasts in our
previous study. However, for the phantom left hand, ERD prior to
movement followed by beta rebound was clearly visible (Fig. 2b
and d). ERD followed by ERS was clearly visible on inhibition trials
(Fig. 3a and c). Arguably, the inhibition-related ERS could be in-
terpreted as a form of postmovement beta rebound. Beta rebound
is thought to reﬂect the deactivation or “idling” of motor cortical
networks (Neuper and Pfurtscheller, 2001; Pfurtscheller and
Neuper, 2001), or the resetting of previously activated motor
networks (Pfurtscheller et al., 2003), and is also present after
motor imagery and median nerve stimulation (Neuper and Pfurt-
scheller, 2001). However, beta rebound lasts for approximately 2 s,
with the peak in its oscillatory power occurring approximately 1 s
after the end of motor tasks (Pfurtscheller et al., 2005). The beta
synchronisation observed on inhibition trials for CL's phantom left
hand was relatively short-lived, lasting approximately 150 ms (see
arrowed ERS peaks in Fig. 3a and c). The onset, duration and fre-
quency band range of CL's inhibition-related ERS thus visibly dif-
fers from postmovement beta rebound. In addition, we have re-
ported largely null results: CL's neurocognitive mechanisms of
volition fell within the range of 14 control participants. Inter-
preting null results is always problematic. The scientiﬁc interest of
this study lies in the fact that apparently normal brain mechan-
isms of volition may exist despite congenital absence of the as-
sociated body part.
In conclusion, a single participant with congenital absence of
the left hand and arm showed EEG activities during voluntary
action and inhibition that resembled those of a healthy control
group. This suggests that the neurocognitive mechanisms under-
lying voluntary action and voluntary inhibition may be central,
and do not require either efference to the target body part, or re-
afference from it. The ability to command voluntary actions, to
inhibit them, and to experience conscious volition, all appear to be
intrinsic to the brain's cortical motor networks. Moreover, these
abilities can develop without direct sensorimotor experience,
perhaps through transfer from cortical events linked to other vo-
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